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inclusion of nonhumans in our moral systems, because
any tendency to give weight to their interests would
always be disadvantageous; would tend to reduce
inclusive fitness, and hence would involve a basic
conflict with the ultimate grounds of human ethics. I
hope to show that this strong view of the impossibility
of animal rights is untrue, although there are grounds
for holding a weaker view that proposes that, when
interests conflict, humans will always have some
tendency to favour relatives over non-relatives, friends
over strangers, and other humans over nonhumans.
Alexander himself believes (pp. 156ff.) that tlle
selective value of indirect reciprocity may be enough
to account for a human tendency to give sentient animals
some status in their moral systems. He suggests that a
person who (for example) was observed by other
humans to be kind and reliable when handling pet
animals would appear to them to be more trustworthy
than someone who behaved cruelly. Trustworthy people
would tend to be given preferential treatment, and, if it
is true that behaviour towards animals tends to be a
good predictor of future behaviour towards other
humans, then tllere would be selection both for kindness
towards animals and for a tendency to approve of such
kindness in other people. The approvers benefit by being
able to make successful predictions about the behaviour
of other people because they are enabled to 'invest'
help in partners who are likely to reciprocate.

RD. Alexander (1987) has proposed that the ultimate
grounds of ethics are evolutionary. Humans have the
capacity for moral reasoning and negotiation, together
with a system of appropriate emotions, such as shame
and guilt when we do wrong, and a sense of moral wellbeing when we do right, because these abilities tended
to increase our ancestors' inclusive fitness in the past.
Fairly simple mathematical models can illustrate how
this could work-one example is the Prisoner's
Dilemma problem in which two individuals must act
cooperatively if they are to maximise their 'survival
points' over a series of interactions (Axelrod, 1984). In
the Prisoner's Dilemma, mutual cooperation leads to
an intermediate score for both parties; mutual defection
gives both a low score, but if one cooperates and the
other defects, then the cooperator scores no points, while
the defector scores maximum points. Over a series of
games the program that achieved the best scores was
one called TIT FOR TAT, which cooperated unless its
partner defected, but after a defection subsequently did
whatever the partner did on the previous round, thus
'punishing' defection and 'rewarding' cooperation.
It might appear tllat an evolutionary tlleory of the
origin of ethics can never be compatible with the
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Alexander seems slightly dubious whether we
should regard these feelings as real moral sentiments if
they are based on the 'selfish' behaviour of the genes.
However tllere does not seem to be any good reason
why we should not say tllat people have real emotions
offriendliness towards (some) animals and real feelings
of approval and disapproval when they are treated well
or badly. f these feelings are ultimately caused by tlle
selection of genes to produce nervous systems that
respond in particular ways to certain environmental
conditions this does not affect their reality. We do not,
after all, believe that our sensations are illusory just
because there are good evolutionary reasons why they
should have evolved.
A real difficulty with the idea of indirect reciprocity
as the sole ground for inclusion of animals in our moral
system seems to me to be the suggestion thar our
behaviour towards them is only significant as a marker
of potential behaviour towards other humans. Thus,
Peter Carruthers argues in his book The Animals Issue
(1992, pp. 153f.), that we have no direct duties to
animals, merely a duty to our fellow humans not to
behave in ways that would tend to erode our capacity
for sympathy, because this capacity is beneficial to the
smooth functioning of society. For Carruthers, sentient
animals do not have a status in their own right but moral
behaviour towards them is just a marker, or signal, of
particular kinds of human behavioural disposition, or
perhaps a kind of training. There seems no reason why
sometlling else should not be substituted, such as moral
behaviour towards cars, bicycles, plants or rocks.
However, this implies that our moral behaviour is
consciously calculated in a way it probably is not.
Behaviour towards animals is a significant predictor of
behaviour towards other humans because it is a response
to something humans and animals have in common,
not because we are deliberately saying, "look what a
decent person I am," when we treat animals well. If I
observe that someone habitually avoids hurting
animals then that is good evidence that he or she is a
kindly individual who is distressed by sufferingexactly the kind of person I would want to have about
if I were ever in trOUble. Conversely, someone who
deliberately hurts animals very probably would have
no compunction about hurting me and I would be very
well advised to avoid them. Behaviour towards mere
objects tells me very little about a person's character,
at most, perhaps it may show whether she is careful or
wasteful, whetller she appreciates art and so on. Thus,
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even if we believe that the way we behave towards
animals is ultimately only important because of its
relevance to behaviour towards humans, sentient
animals have a particular significance because they are
the only entities besides humans themselves who can
function in interactions which test attitudes towards
mental events.
If consideration for animals were no more than a
method by which humans could signal to one another
that they were worthy candidates for cooperative
interactions, then there would be an immediate
probability of deceptive signaling. This, in tum, would
lead to selection pressure for an ability to detect
individuals who were merely pretending and not really
experiencing a concern for animals' suffering, which
would restore the significance of animals' consciousness as the basis of their moral status.
Humans' capacity to act morally must depend on a
constellation of abilities, several of which seem likely
to be relevant to our behaviour towards other species.
One essential element of moral capability must be the
ability to understand that otller individuals have minds
and feelings similar to one's own. Without this, none
of the plausible theories of ethics could function. This
ability would confer benefits independently of any
involvement with our moral capability. For example,
there is a considerable amount of evidence that we are
able to predict tlle behaviour of other individuals by
simulating or modeling tlleir minds (Whiten, 1991).
This ability improves with age and experience-for
example, four-year-old children find it very difficult to
distinguish between the infonnation needed to allow
another person to be sure what will happen in a test and
that which will only allow him to guess (because two
or more outcomes are equally likely). They also have
trouble predicting that two-year-old and six-year-old
children will act differently. Three-year-old children are
aware that other individuals have feelings and wants,
and tlley are able to use these concepts to explain their
behaviour, "the boy went out because he wanted to play
in the snow." However they find it difficult to
understand tlle concept of true and false beliefs, for
example a trick in which a Coca-Cola tin was filled
with milk in the children's presence and then offered to
an individual who had just entered the room did not
seem to make any sense to them.
This may be partly due to an inability to understand
tlleir own thought processes and reasons for believing
something is true. It has been shown that 3 year olds
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can successfully playa game in which they must make
a choice between three inverted cups (one of which
covers a sweet) if the sweet is hidden in their presence,
or if an experimenter points to the correct cup, but they
cannot explain how they know which cup is correct.
Four-year-old children, on the other hand, have no
difficulty in explaining that they know the sweet is
there 'because I saw you hide it' or 'because you
pointed to that cup.' These results are paralleled by
tests in which the children had to choose between a
cup pointed to by someone they knew had seen the
sweet hidden and one pointed to by someone who was
blindfolded while the sweet was hidden. Four-yearolds had no diftlculty in predicting that only the person
who saw the sweet hidden could point it out, but three
year olds did not seem to be able to make the distinction.
This seems good evidence that understanding of one's
own mind is a necessary condition for understanding
the minds of others.
This kind of experiment illustrates very clearly how
possession of a successful 'theory of mind' enables
the child to become increasingly competent in
understanding and predicting the behaviour of other
people and functioning within society. Children who
lack the ability to develop a normal theory of mind are
drastically handicapped in comparison, and this appears
to be the cause of childhood autism. Autistic children
have great diftlculty in deciding what other people are
thinking and appear to achieve such insight only as a
result of laborious 'behaviourist' rea~oning. Like threeyear aIds, they are unable to make sense of false-belief
tasks and jokes, and this does not seem to be simply a
function of level of intelligence, since Downs
Syndrome children with a mental age of 4 or more
have no difficulty with these tesL~. Interestingly, autistic
adults have been reported as complaining that they
"could not read people's thoughts like other people"
(How lin and Rutter, 1987, p. 79), and seem to need to
learn to understand social cues by a laborious process
of memorisation.
Normal people seem to gain insight into the minds
of others by a process of imaginative sympathy (Harris,
1991). By simulating the minds of others they are able
to make successful predictions that enable them to
become effective members of their society. However,
this kind of simulation means that the simulator
experiences a 'mirrored' version of the simulated mind.
This effect must provide a powerful motivation to act
according to the "golden rule" of Do-as-you-would-be-
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done-by. See Laurence Blum's article, 'Particularity and
Responsiveness' (1987) and Iris Murdoch's The
Sovereignty of Good (1970) for further arguments that
there is a natural connection between knowing about
distressed states and being motivated to relieve them.
The ability to think about the mental states of others
is an essential basis for true morality. Individuals who
lack this cannot be moral agents because they can have
no conception that their behaviour can be good or bad
for others, only at most a conception that some kinds
of action may cause reprisals from others or may cause
them to cry out. However, individuals who do possess
the ability to think about mental states are not restricted
to thinking about the mental states of other moral agents.
If such individuals have a reason to simulate the mental
states of other animals they will experience the same
kind of motivation to avoid causing suffering and to
promote happiness that they experience when
simulating the mental states of other humans.
Angus Ross (1983) makes the interesting related
suggestion that the human ability to perceive distress
in others is a capacity that evolved by generalisation
from a more specialised ability to perceive the distress
of young that is possessed by many other vertebrates.
He argues that recognition of distress is not developed
by induction from understanding of one's own mental
states, but that there exists a primitive condition in which
the animal can recognise and respond appropriately to
distress in some others and can experience distress, but
lacks the cognitive ability to understand the correspondence between these two situations. In this
primitive condition, action to relieve perceived distress
has survival value because it will usually mean that
related individuals are helped to survive. With the
evolution of more general capacities for thinking about
mental events, certain species developed the ability to
understand the correspondence between distress in
oneself and in others.
For Ross, the human capacity to think about the self
as an individual in distress (rather than just experiencing
distress), is a 'bottom-up' process that depends crucially
upon a pre-existing ability to perceive and label distress
in others. A species that did not have such a pre-existent
capacity would be unlikely to eVOlve complex social
cognition. Humans who are born without the primitive
capacity to recognise distress will not develop normal
social cognition. In this paper, I have generally assumed
that understanding of other minds is a 'top-down'
process in which self-conscious analysis of one's own
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mind and simulation of otllers play tlle predominant
parts. However, it seems likely that boili kinds of process
are important, and, in particular, a defect in some of the
primitive systems for perceiving emotions in oiliers
could explain why autistic children appear to react
abnormally to oilier people at very young ages when
even normal children are not expected to have a ilieory
of mind. Ross's ilieory is also interesting because it
suggests iliat altruism has its roots in cooperative
processes where ilie signaling and recognition of distress
benefit boili interacting parties. For example, an older
sibling can safely play-fight wiili a younger one if he
breaks off the fight a<, soon a<> it gets too rough, but he
can only tell if ilie game is too rough if he can recognise
distress signals from tlle infant.
The severe handicap of autistic children suggests
iliat, if it is true that (some) oilier species of animal
have minds, then humans who call iliink about animals'
minds by a process of imaginative sympailiy will be
much more successful in practical contacts wiili animals
ilian those who are determined that they will be
objective (Hearne, 1987, pp. 229-230). It seems iliat
subjective iliought about animals allows us to improve
our social skills of interaction wiili animals in ways
tllat noiliing else call.
There is some evidence iliat ilie formatioll of social
bonds between humans and animals has practical
implications-for example fear of humans has been
shown to be a significant factor in farm animal
production and stockworkers wiili good relationships
with their allimals improved farm productivity
(Hemsworili, Barnett and Coleman, 1992). In ilie same
volume, Gordon Burghardt, notes:

some experience wiili ilie species. Previous
experience with horses probably has a
significant effect on whether researchers
become involved in studies of them. Research
on horses is potentially dangerous, and one
must be experienced in handling iliem and
interpreting ilieir behaviour sufficiently to
anticipate future movements iliat might cause
injury. (Crowell-Davis, 1992)
Oral evidence about ilie training of farm horsemen
collected by George Ewart Evans also suggests
similarities between ilie social mechanisms by which
humans learn to cope wiili their own kind and iliose
which they use to handle working animals. One
informant related how, from the age of iliree, he learned
ilie names of all ilie farm horses and ilieir individual
characters. If he wa<> ill and unable to visit ilie stables,
his failier would describe in detail how each horse had
behaved that day. (Evans, 1979, p. 99). Similarly, ilie
psychologist and riding instructor Moyra Williams
(1971) suggests that observational knowledge of
animals' behaviour ha<> to be 'compiled' into intuitive
mentalistic rea<>oning about ilieir thoughts and emotions
if we are to be able to anticipate their future reactions
quickly enough to avoid getting hurt.
The anthropologist G.P. Murdock (1980) confirms
ilie special emotional relationship that exists between
humans and ilieir domestic animals:
... mutuality, a<> I am aware from having spent
my boyhood and youili on a subsistence farm
where I interacted intimately not only wiili
milch cows but also wiili draft oxen and riding,
driving and draft horses. My relations with all
of iliem were characterized by a substantial
measure of mutual confidence, respect and
even affection, coupled with a sense of
noblesse oblige...

Captive bears, because of their large size and
ability to maul human beings quickly, must
be adapted to people so that experimental work
can be carried out safely. Thus, the separation
of boili experimenter and emotion from the
training procedures in scientific studies wiili
bears is just not possible. (Burghardt, 1992)

Murdock believes iliat his statistical analysis of ilie
prevalence of different religious beliefs in primitive
societies has shown that there is a very distinct
psychological difference between lie practice of slavery
and ilie use of working animals (1980, p. 86).
Rheinhold Bergler (1988), concludes from his
comprehensive study of ilie psychology of lie humandog relationship tllat liis is essentially social and bidirectional, with the human partners gaining the

And Sharon Crowell-Davis:
Many researchers of horse behaviour whom I
know personally have a major illterest in the
species tllat extends outside tlleir professional
life. Many own horses, and some would call
tllemselves "horse-lovers." Most have at lea<>t
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psychological and physical health benefits of
association with dogs only if they are prepared to enter
into a mutual relationship. Potential dog owners who
viewed dog-ownership in purely 'rational' terms (more
exercise and so on) were unlikely actually to take the
step of acquiring an animal (p. 126).
If a moral sense depends upon imaginative sympathy
with others this could counter the objection that
evolutionary explanations of morality fail because they
cannot explain why we feel that wrong actions would
remain wrong even if natural selection happened to
'approve' of them. Since we all have direct experience
of good and bad conscious events in our own lives and
since one important part of a moral sense is the ability
to imagine the feelings of otllers, there is a natural link
between the moral sense developed by evolution and
the values (also ultimately developed by evolution) of
certain types of conscious experience. Thus, an
evolution-based moral sense will tend to have a nonarbitrary structure in a way tllat parallels the natural
structuring of consciousness by the connection between
pain and inj ury. It is possible to imagine a creature who
had no tendency to avoid painful experiences, but such
an animal would be unlikely to leave descendants.
Similarly, a moral sense that approved, or was
indifferent to, the infliction of suffering would imply
something very wrong with its owner's capacity to
simulate the feelings of others. A rational agent who
lacked all sense that pain is an evil in itself would not
be able to understand the motivations of other agents
and, like the autistic patients, would be at a loss to
predict what they might do next. This perhaps explains
why Peter Carruthers (1992) cannot be content with
the conclusion tllat we have no duties to animals because
they are not contractors, but feels himself compelled to
claim that they are mere automata. Because of the link
between pain and damage, a moral sense that evolved
because of a need for social cooperation would have to
include a sense that pain is an evil for others as well as
the self. Someone who did not understand this would
not understand the minds of others at all, and someone
who went about inflicting pain without provocation
could not possibly be accepted as a cooperator.
Once a moral sense exists and includes the belief
that pain is an evil, then there is no good reason to
exclude individuals, such as children and animals, who
are not able to demand consideration. Contrary to Peter
Carruthers' claim (1992, pp. 98ff.) that the most
plausible version of an evolutionary theory of morality
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is contractualist and that only rational agents will have
any moral status in the resulting society, a natural moral
sense would be expected to possess utilitarian elements.
It might be possible to suggest a mixed view in which
rational agents who already have some basic views
about the values of other individuals' mental states make
rules that depend upon a combination of self-interest
and concern for others. There are no logical reasons
that compel rational agents acting under a veil of
ignorance to choose rules that give protection to
individuals who are not fully rational. However, if the
only actual rational agents who exist are ones who have
been produced by evolutionary processes, then these
agents may be subject to constraints which mean that
they are in fact compelled to give some kind of moral
consideration to all conscious individuals. The
deliberate decision to exclude from protection those
individuals who are conscious, but not capable oflogical
rationality is itself a moral consideration of those
individuals. If we had really evolved to care only about
what happens to rational agents there would only be a
problem about animals' rights in the case of those
species where we are unsure whether they should be
classified as rational agents or not.
A second possible objection to a view of an
evolutionary grounding for animals' rights is the claim
by some biologists (e.g. Kennedy 1992) that we have
no good reason to believe that animals have sensations
of any kind. There seem to be two main points at issue
here. Firstly, it is sometimes simply claimed that it is
illegitimate to assume that animals have subjective
experiences because there is no way in which this can
be scientifically proved. This claim can be countered
in much the same way as sceptical claims that no-one
has a good reason to believe in any subjective
experiences other than her own, or that no-one has
reason to believe that there is any real world which exists
independently of her own mental experiences. A second,
and more interesting claim, is that sensations themselves
are generated by reasoned introspection of the self and
that animals who do not show this kind of ability to
reason probably have no experiences. There are two
objections that can be made against this. On the one
hand there is evidence that some species of animals do
possess self-awareness, at least to a degree that is
comparable to young human children, so this view of
consciousness does not exclude all species of animals
from moral concern. Chimpanzees seem to perform at
about the level of four-year-old children in the 'hidden
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sweet' test described earlier, since they choose to
respond to pointing by an experimenter they know has
seen the sweet hidden in preference to one who has
not. Since, in human children, success or failure in this
test seems to be correlated with ability to explain the
connection between seeing and knowing, this appears
to be good evidence that chimpanzees have at least this
much introspective understanding of their own minds.
Furthermore, if consciousness depends on some level
of information processing, since we know that fouryear-old humans are conscious because some of us
can remember being four years old, chimpanzees must
also be conscious.
TIle evidence from young children also demonstrates
how painfully difficult thinking about thinking actually
is. Because it comes naturally to us as adult humans we
have a tendency to suppose that reflecting about our
thoughts is a simple process that really is rather like
turning a light on our own minds. Thus Peter Carruthers
claims (1992, pp. 185-6) that the observation that
chimpanzees cannot use self-critical thought to avoid
wasting time and energy when searching for pieces of
hidden food proves they cannot think about their own
thoughts at all, and are probably non-conscious. Amore
plausible account of animal thought seems to be that
the animal spends most of his time in a 'sea' of
unexplained experiences where decision-making
generally feels like guessing does to us. He may know
that an object is present but cannot know how he knows.
This would be a very disturbing state of affairs for an
adult human, but, like our two or three year olds, the
animal experiences no pressing need for an explanation
of his world in terms of serial logic. At the level of the
chimpanzee, or of the human four-year old, the animal
is just beginning to develop the power of explanation,
and to know that he thinks there is a sweet hidden
because he saw it put under the jar.
Comparison between young humans and adult
animals must be used with caution but this kind of study
may at least suggest significant avenues for investigation of what their experiences must be like. For
example, human two-year-olds seem to understand
desires, but not beliefs (Wellman, 1990, pp. 207-242).
Accordingly, it would be expected that animals less
intelligent than the chimpanzee will fail on "theory of
mind" tasks that require attribution of belief (like the
hidden sweet task), but might still succeed on ones that
only require an understanding of motivation. This is
potentially signifiCant if we are interested in the sorts
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of points which Peter Singer and Tom Regan have
discussed concerning the wrongness of killing animals.
Both these authors are interested in the question of
whether some kinds of animals are 'subjects of a life'
or 'persons' rather than simply composites of immediate
sensations. Philosophers have usually tended to hold
that there is a tight connection between desire and belief,
and that an organism can not be said to desire something
unless it also has beliefs about that something. The
evidence from young children may indicate that desires
are prior to beliefs (since understanding of desires
precedes understanding of beliefs), and that it is possible
for an organism to have experiential desires without
anything like adult human beliefs.
If Kennedy (1992) is correct in his hypothesis that
consciousness is actually generated by the ability to
process information about the brain's own states this
would imply that most animals other than apes, possibly
some monkeys, and perhaps elephants and some
cetaceans, do not have sensations. However, both
Kennedy (1992, p. 23) and Humphrey (1986) base their
arguments on the assumption that conscious experiences
are the only way in which an entity could use
information about itself to interpret the activity of
another entity. It seems to me that this is demonstrably
false, since it is perfectly possible to imagine a
computing system which could run a simulation of
itself; compute the effects of varying inputs and use
the output to predict the activity of a different machine.
(ln fact so-called 'virtual machines' are already very
commonly used for various purposes).As Searle has
argued there is no reason to believe that such a machine
would have sensations or experiences. If consciousness
is not the product of self-referential informationprocessing, the lack of self-reference in any species is
not evidence of lack of consciousness.
A third type of objection to a view of rights that
includes some animals is that no-one can have rights
unless they also have duties, or at least some kind of
capacity for moral action. Ross's suggestion (1983)
that the human capacity for altruism is based upon
more primitive abilities to recognise distress in
members of one's own species might lead us to the idea
that some animals may have proto-moral capacities that
we ought to value.
Vicki Hearne (1987) has suggested that the
trainability of domestic animal species is a variety of
proto-moral behaviour, rather similar to early moral
behaviour of young children that is mainly based on
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obedience to respected adults. H. Davies (1989) has
criticised the idea that trained obedience in animals
bears any relation to morality in humans, stating that
he has demonstrated by experiment that rats who are
punished for eating food they are not 'supposed' to, do
not develop a bad conscience, but simply learn to avoid
eating when a human who might deliver punishment is
nearby. This raises several interesting questions about
the way in which true obedience (rather than simply
punishment-avoidance), depends upon the relationship
between the teacher and learner. It might be argued
that the crucial difference between Vicki Hearne's
dogs and Hank Davies' rats lies in the fact that dogs
characteristically have a social relationship with
humans in which the human partner acts as a legitimate
source of authority, but there is no reason for the rats to
obey-why should they? This does not imply that rats
or dogs have a sophisticated ability to reason about
sources of authority~necan imagine a rather simple
system of proto-moral behaviour that could be
compared to pre-schoolers obeying a known teacher,
but not one they think is not 'supposed' to be in the
classroom (Shweder, 1987).

ability to predict the behaviour of conspecifics will have
value for members of such species. Thirdly, that these
behaviours will then be modified by the amount of nonmoral evaluative capacity which the animals are able
to bring to bear.
Kathryn Paxton George (George, 1992) suggests that
animals with proto-moral social behaviour should be
regarded as 'virtuous agents' to the extent that they do
act according to morally valuable impulses, but not as
moral agents because they cannot make a moral choice
to act virtuously. If this is so, these animals must have
something at least very similar to duties, and the ability
to remember and reciprocate good and bad treatment
(tit-for-tat) which is such an important part of protomoral behaviour comes very close to the kinds of ability
demanded for a Rawlsian method of decision-making.
If morality depends upon the possession of a
theory of mind, and some animals have a primitive
T.O.M., then these animals possibly also have genuine
protomoral behaviour, and hence a special value in a
theory of ethics which bases rights upon the possession
of duties.
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